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Abstract: All audiovisual sectors are characterized by 
financial models which only in rare circumstances refer to 
intermediaries and to financial markets. Financial sources 
come from, primarily, public funds and from the pre-sales of 
copyrights to other businesses of the industry.
This chapter describes the most adopted models of 
negotiation of copyrights exploitation in the audiovisual 
industry, differentiating the television, film and web sectors. 
Being the financial sources correlated to pre-sales of future 
profits, the chapter analyses the different sales agreements 
between majors and broadcasters, and the distribution deals 
between distributors and independent producers.
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7.1 Introduction
The financial model of the audiovisual industry changes in relation to 
the sector and to the type of product. Financial sources come from, 
primarily, other businesses of the sector or from public funds. And 
only in rare circumstances does the term refer to intermediaries and 
to financial markets. Nevertheless, television, cinema and web sectors 
have developed financial models which mark themselves in relation 
to the nature of the market players and to the features of the prod-
ucts. Broadcasters find their primary source of financing in selling 
advertising time, even if public broadcasters can also count on state 
financing and, with pay TV, on subscription fees. Movie producers 
avail themselves of public funds and pre-sales of copyrights exploi-
tation managed by distribution companies that, often, anticipate a 
quota of the sales to the producers. Filmmakers active on the web do 
not adopt a structured financing model; considering that the great-
est section of the native web audiovisual products are self-financed, 
financial dynamics related to the web are conditioned by the nature of 
the product. OTT services active in the web market are adopting the 
same dynamic of broadcasters, catalysing resources through advertis-
ing and subscription fees.
The assumption behind the different financial models is that 
audiovisual products can generate revenues in relation to copyright 
exploitation. In the light of the above, this chapter focusses on the most 
adopted models of negotiation of copyrights in the audiovisual industry, 
differentiating the television, movie and web sectors. Due to the great 
commercial potential connected to television rights, we have experi-
enced a market in which the role of television broadcaster has become 
relevant also for other sectors. The entry of other players, active on the 
web through the offer of non-linear audiovisual service, is determining 
a new scenario where financial resources coming from advertising and 
subscriptions are shifting from traditional broadcasters towards the 
new media, mainly the OTT services. Moreover, OTT players are also 
beginning to produce their own programmes, and it is plausible that, in 
the next future, they will partially adopt a broadcaster business model 
integrated with the SVoD business model. The analysis developed in the 
chapter, with reference to traditional broadcasters, could fit partly to the 
emerging business model of OTT players.
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7.2  Broadcasters negotiating TV copyrights in the 
domestic market
Television broadcasters attain the availability of the products, which they 
insert in their programming, producing or buying them. Production and 
purchase are, generally, financed by personal resources coming, prima-
rily, from advertising proceeds; from subscription taxes, in the case of 
public television or pay television; and from government transfers for 
public broadcasters.
The primary role taken on by television broadcasters in the audiovisual 
industry is born, above all, from the economic availability recorded in 
the phases of economic growth. The mechanism is easy to understand. 
The television channel broadcasts the programmes, the public follows 
them and the audience is the “merchandise” which advertising agencies 
negotiate. A programme which can gather a greater audience picks up 
more advertising and, consequently, being more attractive to advertising 
agents, has at its disposal a higher budget to be produced or purchased. 
Lastly, is the company that buys the advertising which finances the televi-
sion product. The final consumer of the television product is represented 
by the advertising agent who in time has taken on the role of main 
funder. Such financial dynamics, typical of commercial television, are 
valid also for public broadcaster, which today can count on government 
funds less and less.
Since the gathering of television advertising depends on the ability of 
other businesses to invest in advertising, and this, in turn, depends on the 
macroeconomic cycle, generally, the financial availability of the broad-
caster is greater in the phases of economic expansion, while it registers a 
reduction in the contraction phases of the economic cycle. The extensive 
economic cycles recorded in the 80s in developed countries, and lasting 
almost 30 years, have handed to television important financial resources 
from advertising. The other types of audiovisual firms have not been 
able to count on such significant financial resources, and this circum-
stance has made television broadcasters the strongest financial players 
on the market, and those apt to condition the production and the price 
of a great range of audiovisual products, even if not primarily related to 
television exploitation.
The main financier of the television product is the firm which buys advertis-
ing; it represents the true price-maker of the market of television copyrights; 
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production budgets and purchase prices of television products are, this way, 
strongly correlated to the macroeconomic cycle and to the financial avail-
ability of advertisers. This also affects production budget and price of cinema 
products.
To understand the financial dynamics of a television product – and 
somehow of cinema ones – we need, therefore, to understand the 
mechanism of emphasizing the value of the product in the eyes of firms 
which buy advertising time and understand how this mechanism could 
be coherent with editorial policies of broadcaster. To this objective, it is 
necessary to introduce the concept of television programme schedule. 
The understanding of such mechanism will be functional also in valuing 
products apt for other markets, like those in the cinema field, but we find 
in television copyrights the most important exploitation market.
Television product: value and programme schedule
The commercial potentialities of the television product contribute 
strongly to condition its value, may it be expressed in production costs 
or purchase price. Other than the artistic aspects of the product, the 
commercial potentialities depend also on the broadcaster’s negotiation 
ability and, above all, on its editorial policies. The tool which translates 
in concrete terms the editorial policies of a television firm is the televi-
sion programme schedule. The TV schedule is the tool through which 
television programming is accomplished, which has the aim to place the 
programmes in a specific temporal space for broadcasting. This fact is of 
fundamental importance in the value of a programme. The day and the 
viewing time during which the programme is broadcasted conditions the 
number of potential viewers and, therefore, it could make the product 
more or less attractive in the eyes of advertising agents.
The use of television by viewers is seasonally characterized, which 
determines audience figures at different times of the year, of the week, 
of the day. Since television consumption varies in time, and the different 
viewing times address a diverse number of viewers, and a different make 
up of it, the television firm has the objective of placing the programmes 
in more adequate time-bands according to programming policies. 
Considering programming, the year is divided in seasons (Fall-Winter, 
Spring and Summer), the week is divided among working days and holi-
days, the day in time-bands. In particular, a programming day is divided 
in three main time-bands: day-time, prime-time and night-time. Day-time 
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corresponds to a time-band which goes from morning until night and, 
generally, it has an average audience level; prime-time is that of dinner 
time and is identified as the highest audience time-band, night-time is the 
night-band, which corresponds to reduced viewing figures.
The main aim of the television firm is to maximize the viewing figures 
on all time-bands, and in particular on prime-time. Public television and 
commercial television try to reach the aim of the viewing data having to 
associate it to different missions of the firm. Public television, for exam-
ple, has to conciliate the aim of the audience figure with that of access, 
that is, the greatest use of television by all target viewers; commercial 
television, on the contrary, can reach the audience target concentrating 
only on specific segments of viewers. The more the broadcaster finances 
itself with advertising, the more it has the necessity to reassure to adver-
tisers the level of audience guaranteed, and for which they have paid. 
Essentially, advertisers pay for advertising space in relation to the type 
of programme and the time-band of the programme itself; the price paid 
by the advertisers is valued according to the viewing figures foreseen. 
The television firm has to, therefore, try to reach the level of guaranteed 
audience, without falling too much below, but without going overboard 
to avoid free public contact. The number of viewers can be measured 
thanks to various variables:
average viewinga) , that is the average number of spectators present in 
a determined time interval;
contactb) , that is the number of times that the spectators have tuned 
in on a channel in a determined time space;
sharec) , that is the percentage of spectators who are tuned on a single 
broadcasting in a determined time interval in relation to all the 
spectators who, at the same interval, are watching television.
Independently from the used calculation variable, it is always true that 
the advertising agent is willing to pay more for programmes which bring 
home the greatest audience. Therefore, the general rule at the base of TV 
programme schedule policies is that the cost of a programme should be 
adequate to the hosting time-band, and therefore, lastly, to the profits 
obtained from the selling of advertisement.
Theoretically, for commercial television, and in part also for public 
ones, since the programmes are financed by advertising, and advertisers 
pay according to viewing data, the programmes must cost considering 
the audience figures which presumably they can obtain.
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The cost of a television programme – whether it is a production cost or 
a purchase cost – has to consider the programming logic. Each segment 
of time has a different commercial value, and the profits are functions of 
the segment of time: it goes without saying that programming has to be 
based on a reliable estimation of foreseen audience figures and the cost 
of a programme has to be coherent with the time-band in which it will 
be placed.
The cost of a television product, expressed in terms of production costs 
or the purchase price, is correlated to its position in the programming. 
A different placing can bring about, for the same product, a different 
value.
There is not a cost and a sole price of a television product, but a different 
cost and a different price considering the placing of the product within the 
schedule programmed by the television firm. The same product can be valued 
differently, either by the same firm or by different broadcaster, depending on 
the programming time-bands in which it is inserted.
This general rule is not, likewise, always pursuable; different variables 
exist which can determine variations of cost and of price from the aver-
age one of the programming time-band originally individualized.
First of all, we consider the efficiency in the make-up of the TV 
schedule. The broadcaster, indeed, tends to satisfy the advertising agent, 
counting, alternatively, to maximize the difference among revenues and 
costs, or to minimize the audience costs. The more the television firm is 
able to place a product in the viewing time-band which maximizes the 
difference between revenue and costs, or minimizes the audience cost, 
the more it will be able to profit on the product; alternatively, it could, 
using that profit, produce more expensive products, or acquire products 
at more expensive prices.
The efficiency in the build-up of the programme schedule allows, at 
even advertising revenues, to maximize margins or, alternatively, to have 
higher budgets for producing and purchasing the products.
The build-up of the TV programme schedule is, also, conditioned by 
the firm’s internal and external variables; among the internal ones the 
image of the channel stands out (that is its stable style in time), the iden-
tity of the channel (represented by the type of audience it refers to) and 
the logical sequence of the schedule, according to which a programme 
cannot be placed in whatever time segment. Among the external ones, 
the demand of advertising spaces coming from advertisers becomes 
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significant, the availability of the adequate product, the programming of 
competitors, the audience humour.
The result is that, taking into account the TV schedule, the value of a 
television product, in terms of production costs or of price, is influenced 
from (Figure 7.1):
the availability of financial resources coming from advertisinga) : in 
times characterized by positive economic trends, the advertising 
gathering assures greater resources and television firms can opt 
for more expensive programmes; for this reason, it is easy to 
find higher production budgets and average purchase prices in 
expansive economic phases and lower budgets and average prices 
decreasing in receding economic phases;
the necessity to satisfy the needs of advertising agentsb) : the restriction 
of having to assure to the advertiser the viewing result promised 
can lead to the need of having to produce or purchase, however, a 
specific product with the risk of having to provide high production 
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budgets or high purchase prices, and of having to accept packaged 
purchases, which include other than sought-after products and also 
less attractive products;
the necessity to answer to the programming of competitorsc) : having to 
face the editorial choices of competitors can create the need to 
carry out an aggressive programming – or an anti-programming – 
which can result in an increase of costs related to producing or 
buying well known products, able to contrast those shown by 
competitors, or to deprive competitors of the availability of certain 
programmes;
the uncertainty related to the mood of the audienced) : the necessity to 
obtain a positive audience answer can lead the television firm to 
allocate in different programming time-bands products of higher 
quality to that of the average of the group; it comes down to, that 
in some circumstances, the production and the purchase cost of 
the products is not proportioned in relation to the programming 
time-band in which it is inserted.
The value of a television product is inspired to editorial programming, but it 
is conditioned by the efficiency in the build-up of the TV programme sched-
ule, by the financial availability of advertisers, from the relationship of the 
broadcaster with the suppliers and from competitors’ policies. The combined 
result of such variables do not allow the identification of a value, and so of a 
cost and of a price, for any single product, nor for the build-up of benchmark 
values of reference.
The logic of the build-up of the programme schedule, nevertheless, 
impugns the value for singular titles and moves the plan of valuing of 
the television product on a portfolio approach: or more than on the 
evaluation of the single product, the television firm operates a value 
of product pockets by audience time-grids, following a logic of cross-
collateralization of revenues, according to which the lower revenues 
recorded on certain products and on specific audience time-bands are 
subsidized by the greater revenues obtained by other products on other 
programming bands.
The modern logic of TV programme schedule moves towards the cross-
collateralization of revenues and makes the identification of a value of a single 
title less significant; it becomes meaningless, however, also the definition of 
a benchmark value for homogeneous products, even when placed within the 
single programming bands.
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Business models and negotiation of TV rights
The negotiation of television copyrights within the domestic market takes 
on different characteristics and different signs in relation to the business 
model. When the television firm is also producer, the right of exploitation 
is already in its title. In this case, the negotiation happens between the 
broadcaster and advertising concessionaires and the broadcaster becomes 
the seller. This is so, naturally, even in the case of productions given under 
contract to small companies, because the broadcaster keeps the title of the 
copyright. In rare cases, some independent producers can find themselves 
in the position of producing autonomously fortunate TV series, or movies, 
which are the object of negotiation with national TV broadcasters. Only 
in this case, the right of exploitation is object of negotiation between the 
producer and the broadcaster, and it becomes the buyer. In this case, the 
value of such right is directly connected to programme schedule policies 
of the broadcaster, and to the product’s success with its audience, but it is 
also strongly conditioned by the negotiating strength of the parts.
7.3  Broadcasters negotiating TV rights in the 
international market
The structure of the market for international sales:  
United States vs. Europe
On the foreign market, the negotiation of television copyrights exploita-
tion becomes peculiar. To understand better the negotiation of television 
copyrights on international markets, it is necessary to start from the 
structure of the demand and of the supply in such markets. These can be 
classified in demand-driven and supply-driven markets.
For European producers, for example, the access of their product on 
the international market is a complex question. European products, 
generally, have a strong local artistic matrix and, often, are conditioned 
by the native language; they present, however, a reduced level of univer-
sality and a low potential of exportation. For this reason, with the due 
exceptions, the foreign market represents a minimum quota of proceeds 
of a European audiovisual product.
The European market of television copyrights is substantially demand-driven; 
for European broadcasters, negotiations are mainly finalized to buying a 
foreign product, rather than selling a domestic product.
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On the contrary, the American audiovisual industry is among the few 
which registers high levels of exports of its own product. Even if, in time, 
the trend of foreign sales of American products has undergone diverse 
variations, it is possible to say that the American market is supply-driven.
The American market of television copyrights is substantially supply-driven; 
for American broadcasters the negotiations are oriented primarily to the sales 
of national products.
The structure of the market allows identification of some characterizing 
elements of the international market of television copyrights. Traded 
products are primarily those of the fiction type, more apt to be exported 
and ready to meet the interest of viewers in diverse geographic areas. 
Since the market of copyrights referred to foreign products needs a 
specific knowledge of the foreign market, the commercial chain foresees, 
generally, the presence of third parties who mediate among producers 
and buyers.
Considering such scenery, the value of the product is essentially a 
value referred to the price of purchase; only in the case of international 
participation and co-productions, for the broadcaster the value of the 
product has also a dimension connected to the cost of production and to 
the sale price of the copyrights.
The price of the copyright, other than being affected by the contractual 
strength of the parts, and of the programming policy of the broadcaster, 
is strongly conditioned by the complex commercial chain and from a 
relevant degree of informative asymmetry among buyers and sellers.
The different nature of European and American markets has led to a 
different distributive structure of the same: the first integrated by televi-
sion firms, the second by distribution firms.
Substantially, since American television firms do not buy in a signifi-
cant way foreign products, in the United States the international televi-
sion market is sales-oriented, so supported by the interest of producers 
to sell: are, than, the majors that, through their subsidiaries or through 
third-parties operators, try to place their products abroad.
In Europe, the international television market is purchase-oriented 
(buy-oriented), since television firms tend to get abundant foreign prod-
uct to insert within their own channels.
The union of two markets with opposing needs (of sales the American 
one, of purchase the European one) and with differently integrated 
distributive structures (of production the American one, of distribution 
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the European one) has determined a lengthy commercial chain which 
unwinds through more intermediaries and produces numerous negoti-
ating steps.
Actors active in the market of international sales
The international market of television copyrights today is characterized 
by the existence of a compound commercial chain in which three catego-
ries of subjects operate: the production firms, the third-party operators 
that become intermediaries among producers and buyers and that can 
assume different roles and functions, and the television firms.
Producers are essentially represented by the so called “international 
majors”, in particular the American ones, able to furnish continuously 
universal and spectacular product and content, so to have success at the 
international level, not only domestic. The role of independent producers 
is, on the contrary, classified as marginal and characterized by a sporadic 
presence attached to single products.
Among third-party subjects, it is possible to classify three categories of 
operators: the agents, the distributors and the intermediaries.
The agent represents the less structured figure; it identifies itself with 
a person, or a firm, that, stemming from a formal mandate of repre-
sentation – or informally – functions as an intermediary between the 
production of which it takes care of the interests and a local broadcaster, 
probing and verifying the interest of the broadcaster to purchase specific 
products. The agent does not get involved in a sale contract, which is 
signed directly by the parties, and does not take on any risks or obliga-
tions. At the base of its mediation, the agent asks for a fee calculated as 
a percentage of the sale price. The business between the agent and the 
producer ends with the conclusion of the contract and the settlement of 
the agreed compensation.
The distributor is a specialized firm in the acquisition from the producer 
of the licencing copyrights of the work, for specific areas and for defined 
periods and in the exploitation of such copyrights. In the distribution deal 
the producer and the distributor define the characteristics of the deal and 
the role of distribution; the sales agreement establishes the terms of the 
deal between the distributor and the purchasing television broadcaster.
Generally, the financial role of the distributor is to cover the distribu-
tion expenses; sometimes, the distributor anticipates to the producer 
part of the future revenues assuring him a minimum guarantee.
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The possibility of a missed sale, or of a sale at a lower price from 
what expected, exposes the distributor to the risk of losing the expenses 
incurred, and of the minimum guarantee. Even the producer is exposed 
to the risk of not having any revenues from the sale, if the amount of the 
sale is not enough to cover what is due to the distributor to cover the 
expenses and as a distribution fee.
Summarizing, the distributor takes risks, but has a limited risk expo-
sure; there is an economic and calculated connection which connects 
the producer and the distributor during the sale period; the distributor 
has to report to the producer a detailed account of revenues and their 
sharing.
The intermediary is represented by a firm, or more rarely by a person, 
who buys from the producer the copyrights of one or more products, 
for a specific time period and for specific areas. Substantially, we are 
facing a subject who assumes the property of the copyrights, making a 
purchase preceding a future sale (so it does not buy on commission), 
and takes on the risk of no sales, or the risk that what has been bought 
will not be “placed on the market”; the risk is that the purchased 
merchandise would remain “in stock”. This role coincides with a pure 
intermediary figure defined “dealer”, which in the audiovisual industry 
is known as “entrepreneur”, to distinguish it from simple agents and 
from distributors. For the entrepreneur, however, the initial financial 
pledge coincides with the full price of transfer of the copyrights of 
exploitation and with the necessary expenses to sell the copyrights on 
foreign markets.
Generally, resorting to an intermediary is extremely useful because 
the intermediary who operates as entrepreneur, contrary to the agent and 
to the distributor, frees the majors of numerous operational, economic, 
financial and legal risks, by accepting them. In particular:
the a) operational risk, referring mainly to the predisposition and to 
the handing over of materials of the product sold apt to the needs 
of the buyer for the specific area, is transferred to the intermediary;
the b) financial risk is reduced because the sale to the intermediary 
happens in advance – often even before finding the effective final 
buyer, and often even before the product is made; the financial 
dynamics of payments of the majors are, so, attached to the 
relationship between major and intermediary, and only indirectly 
to those between intermediary and buyer;
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the c) economic risk of the sale, is cancelled because it is transferred to 
the intermediary;
the d) currency risk is void because transferred to the intermediary: 
between major and intermediary the contract is, however, always 
regulated in money of the major;
the e) legal risk is void because transferred to the intermediary who 
stipulates the contract with the buyer;
the f) fiscal risk – understood as possible application of taxes on 
revenues coming from the exploitation abroad of the copyrights – 
is void because transferred to the intermediary;
the monitoring of proceeds flow (g) monetary risk) is taken care of at a 
domestic level because it is referred only to dealing between major 
and the intermediary;
the book-keeping for a single title is negotiated with the h) 
intermediary (allocation risk).
Considering the risks, the intermediary is invested of a significant 
bargaining power in the negotiation with the broadcaster – resulting 
conditioned only for the duration of the availability of the right and the 
geographical areas where he can act – and he is independent from the 
major in defining the sale conditions to apply. The sale contract which 
the intermediary stipulates with the buying broadcaster is not governed 
by the producing major that supplies the product even if, unavoidably, it 
is affected by the financial-economic and contractual conditions existing 
between major and intermediary. Considering so, the potential profit 
of the intermediary does not foresee a “cap” from the original contract 
of purchase of the product and, theoretically, there are no limits, other 
than what can derive from the dynamics of the market. Therefore, in 
the market of television copyrights a final price imposed or suggested 
by the producer and the distributor is not recognized, as it is for some 
industrial products. The intermediary can act at his own discretion to 
set up the mark-up and the final price of a certain product and can at 
his own discretion differentiate it by areas. So it happens, then, that the 
same product could register different sale prices within different areas, 
either if such areas have as reference the same intermediary, or in the 
case – more obvious – in which different intermediaries take care of 
different areas.
The intermediary who operates as entrepreneur takes care personally of the 
contract with the broadcaster and is not subject to any cap from the major on 
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the final price that he could ask to the purchasing television broadcaster. The 
same intermediary is free to apply, for the same product, different prices to 
broadcasters operating in different countries.
What was said is true, specifically, for the intermediary entrepreneur, for 
the figure which corresponds to the dealer and that, not inverting the 
business cycle, takes on the financial and unsold warehouse risk. It can 
also happen that on the market are found intermediaries operating using 
an inversion of the business cycle that from “production-sale” transforms 
to “sale-production”. It is always an entrepreneur who, but, in this case, 
buys from the major or from independent producers the rights of exploi-
tation only when he has a specific request from a foreign broadcaster. 
This happens, in particular, when a request of specific products is put 
forward directly by the broadcaster, already a client of the intermediary. 
In such circumstances, the intermediary carries out a “short selling”, that 
is the sale of a product not yet in stock. Normally, to manage the risk of 
a “short selling”, the intermediary tends to combine as much as possible 
the timing of the sale contract with the purchase contract; it can happen, 
in such a scenario, that the two prices – of sale from the major to the 
intermediary and of purchase of the broadcaster from the intermediary – 
are contextually negotiated. Such circumstance can be found, above all, 
in contexts in which the relationship among intermediaries and clients 
has become solid in time, and in which the intermediary is not alone in 
proposing its own products in portfolio, but the client itself commissions 
some specific titles according to the needs matured within the firm. In 
such cases, either to safeguard the relationship with the intermediary, 
to avoid the dispersion of shopping around, or because, more often, it is a 
restricted number of titles, the broadcaster prefers however to resort to 
the intermediary, preferring him to the direct purchase from the major. 
It results in a dynamic of the make-up of the price more similar to the 
typical one of the agent.
Television firms active in different areas distinguish themselves for 
two essential variables: the technological paradigm, which determines 
the modality of broadcasting the programme, and the structure of the 
financing. In relation to the first aspect, it is possible to distinguish 
among cable, terrestrial, satellite and digital television; in relation to the 
economic criterion, we need to distinguish public firms and commercial 
television.
Each television firm, independently from its own nature and from 
broadcasting technologies, has the need to supply itself with products to 
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place in its programming. However, the combination between economic 
and technological variables which characterize it conditions strongly the 
policies of pricing. There are three variables to point out:
the degree of vertical integration of the firma) : this can cover all or 
part of the value chain of the sector, from the creation of content 
to production, from the multimedia packaging to the offer of 
extra services, until the distribution and the furnishing of the 
infrastructure for transmitting the signal;
the level of multi-channels and the number of programmesb) : television 
firms are different due to the number of channels and the number 
of programmes; the different modalities of broadcasting bring 
about various costs and allow different availability of channels;
sources of fundingc) : public television finds its financing primarily in 
public funds and in subscription fees and, secondly, in commercials 
coming from private firms; commercial television has as its 
exclusive resource advertising; pay television is financed either by 
advertising or thanks to subscriptions.
It is understandable how the three variables strongly affect the pricing 
adopted by the firm. A greater degree of vertical integration makes the 
firm more autonomous from the purchase function and gives it a strong 
negotiating stance; a greater level of multi-channels and of programmes 
increases the need of the product and puts the firm in a weak condition 
in relation to the seller; the great or minor dependence from advertising 
resources connects the ability of purchase to the variance of the economic 
cycle: positive economic trends translate in a greater advertising gather-
ing and increase the potentiality of expenditure, negative trends lessen 
the budget available for purchases.
Substantially, the characteristics of the television firm determine differ-
ent needs of product, different bargaining strengths and different volumes 
of expenditure. The result is that, on the international television market, 
and within single countries, various firms can endure, for the same prod-
uct, purchasing prices strongly differentiated, of which each one can be 
coherent with the organizational and economic structure of the firm itself.
The structure of the television firm conditions the pricing of the product to 
be bought. When on the market there are firms with a different structure and 
a different volume of expenditure, there is neither a sole price for the same 
product, nor for homogeneous products, but each price has its own economic 
rationality.
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Typologies of deals and agreements for international sales
The negotiating mechanisms of television copyrights on international 
markets follow procedures which have consolidated themselves in time 
and have been dictated, mainly, by the distributive structure of markets 
oriented to sales and by markets oriented to purchasing, as to also by the 
specific needs of counter-parties.
It is clear how the different distributive structures generated by 
American producers, oriented to sales, have met up with those of 
European television, oriented to purchasing, and as to how such meeting 
has determined the consolidation of progressive negotiating steps, medi-
ated by third-party intermediaries in relation to producers and buyers, 
with a consequent increase of the number of commercial steps.
In such a scenario, the true market presents a multitude of negotiating 
schemes which meet the different needs of sellers and buyers.
The objectives of seller and buyer are different in relation to three 
elements:
the a) type of product;
the b) amount of product;
the c) conditions of exploitation of the product: geographical area, 
period of exploitation, number of runs.
The producer wants to sell, together with a quality product, also the 
less successful product, to sell all the available product and to offer the 
least possible number of licenses and reruns. The buyer is interested in 
purchasing the best product, to get only the product which appeals to 
him and to obtain the greater number of licenses and reruns.
The necessity to conciliate the opposing needs of sellers and buyers 
makes it necessary to resort to different negotiating schemes in view of 
the alternative which best combines the needs of counter-parties. The 
presence of agents, distributors and intermediaries on the international 
sales market is principally justified by such necessity because in different 
hypotheses it corresponds to the best solution of negotiation.
Among the many alternatives, the most significant ones, and which 
are greatly relevant in this case, are connected to two specific negotiating 
options:
the a) output deal and the volume deal stipulated directly among 
majors and television broadcasters;
the b) package deal stipulated among intermediaries and broadcasters. 
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Generally television firms use both options, which can take on different 
meaning, due to the conditions of the market and the strategies adopted 
by the television firm (Figure 7.2).
Sales between majors and broadcasters: output deal and 
volume deal
The contracts stipulated by television firms directly with the majors have, 
generally, the objective of covering the structural needs of product of 
the firm. Substantially, the broadcaster looks, through a direct deal with 
the major, to assure itself a supply at the source. The output deal, in fact, 
establishes a pledge by the firm to buy, and an obligation by the major to 
sell, all the product created by the major in a determined period pointed 
out by contract; the volume deal circumscribes the same contractual 
object to a specific volume of product.
Such contracts have, generally, a multi-year duration, variable from 3 
to 5 years, and include as a purchasing object an articulated mix of prod-
ucts which include the main types: output deal and volume deal include, 
always, both television and cinema products, of current type (never 
previously distributed within the area of purchase) and of the re-run type 
(already distributed on the territory). The contract includes also a precise 
outline of the qualifying elements of the product and the purchasing 
conditions; for example, for cinema products it is possible to establish 
what are to be bought by the broadcaster: one option is to select, among 
all the movies produced by the major, only those distributed during 
the year within the purchasing area; for re-run movies, can be fixed a 
maximum amount of a yearly purchase, with the broadcaster having the 
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freedom of choosing the titles from the list of the major or, alternatively, 
can be fixed the number of titles to be bought and their unitary value. 
Also for television products, in the contract are specified both the quality 
standards of re-run products and those of current products; for the series, 
we can foresee integral purchase of the series, or the buying of episodes 
related to only one season, with the option of the purchase of the next 
season. Also for television products, the contract specifies, generally, 
the characteristics which they need to have; for example, for buying TV 
series it can be indicated as requirements of the product to be bought the 
value of the production budget or the number of series or the format.
With the agreements of output deal and volume deal the broadcaster 
has the benefit of assuring itself a significant quantity of product in 
comparison to a disadvantage represented by the uncertainty in relation 
to the product which it is obligated to buy. As a matter of fact, above 
all, from the second year on of the contract time, even if the qualifying 
elements of the product indicated in the contract limit the arbitrage of 
the supply, the television firm will find itself in the condition of selecting 
an unknown product because it has been produced at a time later than 
the signing of the contract.
Package deal
Thanks to package deals stipulated with intermediaries, television 
firms take care of the necessity of integrative and variable products. 
Substantially, once a minimum and generic stock of products has been 
reassured, the package deal allows broadcasters to meet: (a) related to 
quantity, the needs dictated by additional use to cover hours of program-
ming; (b) related to quality, the necessity of having at one’s disposal the 
single and specific products already known.
According to contracts among intermediaries and majors, inter-
mediaries can think of putting together a package deal, pure or mixed. 
Generally, the intermediary stipulates a package deal with the television 
firm offering products already bought from the major, titles which he 
has already at his disposal (pure package deal). In some cases, the inter-
mediary can integrate the offer with added titles not yet available at his 
disposal, requested directly from the broadcaster; this is common when 
the television firm does not have an output or volume deal with the major 
represented by the intermediary and expresses the need of product of the 
major not included in the original package of the intermediary and not 
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at his disposal. In this case, the intermediary operates in a mixed way: 
as pure intermediary for titles which he has already in his portfolio and 
as a broker for the titles which he adds to the original packet, thanks to a 
specific input of the television firm, but that he will have to buy from the 
major. In this case, the intermediary limits his exposition to risk, both 
in relation to the risk of not sold and to the temporal gap between the 
buying of rights and the sale of the same.
Output/volume deal vs. package deal
The different intrinsic characteristics of the two typologies of agreement, 
those used to close the deal with the major producers and those used 
with intermediaries, determine an impact also on the average prices 
generally applied in contracts (Figure 7.3).
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In relation to the output deal and to the volume deal, the package deal 
can be made up also by a limited number of titles (up to a minimum of 
two or three titles) and can relate only to specific typologies of product 
(cinema, television, current or re-run): it results, however, strongly cut 
out on the specific needs of the broadcaster. Naturally, it is not a perfect 
tailored product because even the intermediary – who has bought or 
needs to buy from the major – is conditioned by the need of getting 
rid efficiently of his own portfolio titles, minimizing the risk of storage, 
that is, the risk of some unsold products. Excluding such consideration, 
is, however, without any doubt that the package deal represents a less 
standardized contract, in relation to the output and volume deal, thanks 
to which the broadcaster overcomes the uncertainty of the product 
present in great quantity contracts stipulated directly with the major. 
Even in relation to exploitation, there are differences between the two 
contractual typologies; output deal, volume deal and package deal foresee 
specific conditions of exploitation sufficiently standardized – for cinema 
products, generally, 5 passages in 5 years while for television series the 
conditions can be more favourable. However, often, in the package deal, 
the broadcaster is able to obtain exploitation conditions more convenient 
than those usually negotiated.
The different level of standardization of the purchased basket of 
products, and the highest level of risk incorporated in the output and 
volume deal, in relation to future products still unknown at the time of 
the contract, determines a first strong variation in the average level of 
price between the two types of agreement. Substantially, the contracts 
stipulated by television firms with the major foresee, generally, average 
purchase prices lower than those stipulated with the intermediaries. So 
apart from the mark-up applied by the intermediary. The two types of 
contracts put together, as a matter of fact, types of different products 
with different characteristics of the package and different disclosure of 
the product.
Generally, the output and the volume deal are more convenient for the buying 
television firm in terms of the quantity of the product and of price; the pack-
age deals stipulated with the intermediary are more convenient in terms of 
product quality and of exploitation conditions. It is not, however, possible to 
compare, not even for the same type of products, the average price paid by a 
television firm for an output or volume deal with the price obtained on the 
package deals.
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The mechanisms of valuing of the products purchased, or through output 
and volume deal or in packets by intermediaries, introduce an additional 
critical element in comparing the price among various contracts.
The valuing of products happens through an escalator which applies differ-
ent price levels in relation to the value of some economic variables referred 
to the product. For cinema products, the used parameter is the box office: the 
higher the box office, the higher the sale price. For television products, the 
more used reference parameter is the hourly cost for format; for each type of 
format, the higher the cost of production the higher the sale price.
So, the value of the escalators varies, first of all, in relation to the type 
of product because cinema and tv products are valued based on different 
parameters. Also for homogeneous products, it is possible to find differ-
ent values: first of all, because the majors can adopt different value of the 
escalator; for example, two movies of two different majors which have 
obtained the same box office can be valued differently according to differ-
ent reference escalator used by the majors. Secondly, because the condi-
tions which influenced the class of attribute in which the product is placed 
can be different: for movies, for example, the dimension of the purchasing 
market is important (the greater is the number of viewers, greater, with the 
same conditions, is the value of the product); for television products, the 
operational efficiency of the major (the greater operational efficiency of the 
major, means less hourly cost of production, even to other conditions) and 
its commercial policies. Additionally, in the output deal and volume deal the 
valuing has to incorporate the risk taken on by the buyer in relation to the 
missing knowledge of the product due to a future production.
The mechanism of valuing of the product determines, therefore, a 
strong variability of prices also for products homogeneous in technical-
productive characteristics.
The mechanism of valuing of television products, and in particular the 
parameters of the escalator adopted by the majors, do not allow a comparison 
of price, not even among homogeneous products, and hinder the singling out 
of a reliable benchmark price.
Lastly, there is another variable able to impugn the valuing of a television 
product and, consequently, of the mark-up and the final price applied by 
intermediaries: the production model of the majors. These produce, prima-
rily, resorting to forms of co-production with independent producers and 
taking on, often, also the role of national distributor. Attributing a definite 
value to a single product for foreign sales (allocation) can be conditioned 
by the convenience of the major to exploit the single product in view of the 
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dynamics of profits sharing with the independent producer. So, it is reason-
able to hypothesize that the major would be oriented to exploit more those 
titles for which the proceeds of foreign sales do not have to be shared out 
with the independent producer. When such titles are not of great success or 
of great additional value, the resulting consequence is that the best products 
can be valued at discount and those of less success can be valued at premium. 
This attitude of the majors may determine several effects on the pricing:
in the agreements stipulated directly between the major and the a) 
television firm, an evaluating opacity is expressed by the single title 
which takes on a value not easily understandable;
the autonomy of television broadcaster, and of the intermediaries, b) 
in valuing every single product of the sold package, can be limited, 
at the source, by this specific need of the major;
in the agreements stipulated through intermediaries, a definite c) 
break in the economic link between the two prices can be caused: 
that of purchase by the intermediary from the major and that of 
sale by the intermediary to the television firm. If the major sells 
to the intermediary a quality product, giving it a low value, and 
the intermediary, in the sale to the television firm, applies a more 
coherent value, it can be determined a significant distance between 
the two prices that, yet, does not correspond to the economic 
substance of the transaction, but it is only the function of an 
accounting criterion used in valuing the product.
The production model of the majors hit the value of the single title; the 
necessity to manage the allocation in function of the revenue sharing with 
associated producers determines a substantial impossibility to precisely 
reconstruct the value attributable to the single product. In sales channelled 
through intermediaries, such circumstance makes not significant the differ-
ence between the purchase price paid by the intermediary to the major and 
the sale price paid by the television firm to the intermediary.
7.4  The economic reasons for using intermediaries in 
international television markets
The presence of a long commercial chain in the market of international 
sales creates a different negotiation model from that used for domestic 
markets. In particular, the presence of intermediaries, including an 
extra commercial passage in relation to the direct negotiation between 
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producer and broadcaster that buys the copyrights, influences the 
dynamics of pricing and those of the final price of the purchased prod-
uct. The presence of intermediaries, other than finding justification in 
the services offered to selling majors and to televisions that buy, can be 
justified by an economic space that makes the negotiation triangularly 
convenient to all parties: majors, intermediaries and broadcasters. To 
verify the existence of such economic space, we need to recall what has 
already been explained in the matter of economics and of pricing and 
apply it to the negotiating schemes of international sales.
Economics and pricing of majors
The economics of the majors correspond to those of other producers 
of audiovisual works, also being characterized by the complexity of the 
business structure and by significant volume of production.
For the majors, the greatest difficulty in determining the pricing is that 
related to the estimation of revenues. If considering costs, the majors 
can operate looking for a greater operational efficiency which consents 
to knock prices down; from the revenues side, each valid alternative to 
limit the variability becomes the element of fundamental importance.
Resorting to intermediaries allows the majors both to cut down costs 
and to stabilize revenues; this allows them to apply to the intermediary, 
considering such advantages, reduced prices.
The Formula 5.4, which is significant of the pricing of a product, can 
be best expressed, in relation to the majors, as (Formula 7.1):
sales revenues (p x q) = oc + dc + fc + ic + comr + techr  




oc = overhead costs
dc = direct costs of production
fc = financial costs
ic = insurance costs
comr = completion risk
techr = technical risk
legr = legal risks
unsr = unsold or stock risk
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The overhead costs of the majors refer to the cost of employees and 
to the general expenses; to these are added the direct expenses of single 
productions; the financial expenses are connected to the financial costs 
of the debts and to insurance costs. The risks refer to, primarily, to those 
of process or of completion (that is of no completion of the work or of 
the realization of a final product not corresponding to the projected 
prototype); to technical risks, connected to the quality of materials; to 
legal risks; and to the unsold risk (or unsold stock risk).
The major is interested in reaching and establishing the rate of 
programmed profit and, to reach such an objective, can follow four ways: 
increase the volume of sales, fix a higher unit price, cut down costs and 
limit the risk exposure. The major, however, will be interested to avail 
itself of an intermediary if such solution allows it to meet at least one of 
the conditions outlined.
Considering costs, as explained, resorting to the intermediary who 
functions as entrepreneur allows the major to cut down the burden 
connected to risks – except the completion one – and to some manage-
ment costs. Considering revenues, for the major, the intermediary can 
be functional in stabilizing or in increasing the volume of sales: (a) clos-
ing contracts for more areas; (b) reducing the volume of the unsold of 
various areas.
The possibility to increase through the intermediary the number of 
areas and to minimize the percentage of the unsold makes it convenient 
for the major to close the negotiation with the intermediary even at lower 
prices of its own technical price, because the quantity of the sold product 
allows, just the same, the reaching of the desired mark-up.
Saving on costs, or stabilizing or increasing revenues, allows the major 
to apply to the intermediary reduced prices keeping unchanged its own 
rate of profit expected by the investment.
A simple example helps to quantify what is expressed above. Let us 
assume that, using the Formula 7.1, a major would be in the position of 
choosing between two alternatives available for the sale of two movies: 
that of the direct sale to the broadcaster and that of the sale through 
the intermediary. Let us assume that the economics of the pricing have 
been estimated, for each movie, in the amount of $5 for each typology of 
cost and of risk, for a total of $40 for each movie, and that the mark-up 
wanted for each movie is equivalent to $10 (25%) for a total of $20 on 
two movies1:
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I. Direct sale
In the hypothesis of direct sale, the Formula 7.1 of the pricing would be 
equal to:
50 x 2 = 10 +10 +10 + 10 + 10 +10 +10 + 10 + 20 7.2
The unit price for each movie which assures the programmed profit rate 
should be equal to $50.
II. Sale with intermediary
Let us assume that resorting to an intermediary translates in a saving, 
for each one of the two movies, of $1 on overhead costs, on financial 
costs and on legal costs, and to an annulment of technical and unsold 
risks, for a total saving of $16 on two movies. The pricing formula would 
signify a different equilibrium among revenues and costs:
37 x 2 = 8 +10 +8 + 10 + 10 +8 + 20 7.3
The unit price which the major could apply to the intermediary on a 
single movie, leaving unchanged its own profit, would be equal to $37, 
$13 less of the applicable in the hypothesis of direct sale.
Resorting to the intermediary, creates for the major an economic space for the 
application of lower unit prices in relation to the applicable price in the direct 
sale; selling to the intermediary, the major can apply prices below the price 
that it should attribute in the direct sale to reach the same rate of return.
Economics and pricing of intermediaries
Generally speaking, the economics of the pricing of an intermedi-
ary correspond to that of any other provider of services. The activity 
of intermediation is looked at as a service that, generally, is produced 
following the purchase, represents intangible goods, presents significant 
fixed costs whose level varies according to the nature of the activity of 
intermediation and offers – stand-alone – low economies of scale.
The difficulty in determining the technical price makes revenues an 
even more significant variable in the process of pricing. In relation to 
the economics, the intermediaries are naturally prone to focus their 
attention on the estimated revenues, rather than on a more efficient and 
accurate analysis of costs. Since, generally, the services are first sold and 
then produced, the intermediary has the possibility to estimate revenues 
with greater accuracy.
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Additionally, the activity of intermediation is characterized by a demand 
inelastic to prices: clients tend not to react to price changes or, alternatively, 
apply minimum changes on the quantity requested; rarely, facing a price 
variation, clients are inclined to change the furnishing firm.
On the contrary, the client pays attention to the perceived value, 
valuing on one hand, his need and the investment quality, on the other 
hand, the savings in terms of non-monetary costs which the work of the 
intermediary brings about. Also for this reason, the price of competitors 
loses part of its strength.
Such circumstances permit, generally, to the intermediary more possi-
bilities to apply high mark-up and final prices, without incurring in a 
decrease of purchasing orders or losing the client.
For such reason, the pricing of the intermediation activity adopts 
less to a “cost-based methodology”, and it is strongly conditioned by 
the orientation to maximize revenues. It is important, therefore, to 
understand what is the economic space to the pricing policy of the 
intermediary.
For an intermediary negotiating television copyrights the Formula 
7.1 related to the pricing of the product takes on a different configura-
tion (Formula 7.4) in relation to the one of the producing major; for the 
intermediary, the costs of completion are not present anymore, while the 
direct costs are connected to the purchase of product by the majors and 
are, consequently, comparable to the cost of raw materials of production 
of a traditional industrial firm:
sales revenues (p x q) = oc + dc + fc + ic + techr + legr  
                                          + unsr + mark-up 7.4
Also for the intermediary, as for the major, the objective is to maximize 
profit. However, compared to the major, the intermediary has a more 
rigid and less foreseeable structure. In terms of strictness of costs, 
contrary to the major, the possibility to outsource specific functions 
is very limited, because the intermediary represents himself as the 
commercial link with the buying broadcaster. In particular, technical, 
legal and unsold risks can take on ex post values much more important 
than those hypothesized. It is sufficient to think about the unsold risk: the 
cost of the unsold product can determine heavy loss on single negotia-
tions. When the unsold risk is managed the intermediary has also borne a 
financial risk explained by the temporal gap elapsed between the buying 
date of the copyright by the major and that of sale to the broadcaster.
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Considering costs and risks, therefore, the intermediary can only acti-
vate the lever of his own managerial efficiency that, however, is limited 
by the difficulty, typical of services, in obtaining significant economies 
of scale.
Therefore, the intermediary uses the revenues as a main lever of his 
own pricing. Since the revenues depend on the price and on the quantity 
sold, he will try to sell more or at a higher price. The uncertainty about 
the level of costs and of risks translates itself, however, in the necessity 
to apply high mark-up, which affects the price, to obtain the margins 
of profit desired. The economic space produced by the negotiation with 
the major, therefore, makes it easy to apply a price compatible with the 
needs of the intermediary.
Let us look again at the example of the two movies bought by an 
intermediary at $37 each; let us assume that, for the sale of the movies to 
the broadcaster, the costs which the intermediary faces are the same of 
the half of those incurred by the major, that the intermediary attributes 
the unsold risk of the specific negotiation related to the two movies a quota 
part of his general risk of unsold goods equal to $5, and that the profit 
rate desired is the same of that applied by the major, therefore the 25% 
corresponding to almost $17 of mark-up per movie. We would have:
69 x 2 = 5 + 74 + 5 + 5 + 5 + 5 + 5 + 34 7.5
The intermediary, to get the unitary rate of profit desired ($17) would 
need to apply a price equivalent to $69 per movie; this way he would 
obtain almost a yield of 25%. In relation to the purchase price of the 
major, equivalent to $37, the intermediary would apply an increase of 
almost 86% – that however would result equivalent to 38%, if compared 
with the price of $50 that the major would apply to the broadcaster in 
the case of direct sale.
In case the intermediary perceived the uncertainty of high costs and 
risks, his pricing should incorporate such prevision. Let us assume 
that the intermediary estimates it probable that one of the two movies 
of the bought package from the major is unsold; the pricing formula 
of the only sold movie, incorporating such risk, should however include 
the purchase cost of the unsold movie, and should cut down the value of 
costs from technical and legal risks not met because of the no sale, other 
than the mark-up on the second movie. So we would have:
116 x 1 = 5 + 37 + 5 + 5 + 2.5 + 2.5 + (5 + 37) + 17 7.6
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If the intermediary would want to insure himself against the risk of one 
unsold movie, keeping his mark-up on the sold movie unaltered, he 
should sell the movie at the price of $116, with an increase of over 300% 
in relation to the purchase price, and of almost 230% in relation to the 
price that the major would apply to a direct sale to the broadcaster.
When the intermediary operates on an inverted cycle, the dynamics of 
pricing do not change in their basic structure: the unsold risk transforms 
in supplies risk, the financial risk is limited but, in the majority of cases, 
continues to be so.
Valuing the advantage of using intermediaries
The existence of an economic space that justifies the presence of an 
intermediary, therefore, needs to be verified, first of all, valuing the 
determinants of risks and costs incurred by the intermediary, secondly 
considering as a parameter the gap between the price applied by the 
intermediary to the broadcaster and the hypothetic target price applied 
by the major in the direct sale, and not comparing the sale price of the 
intermediary with that of the purchase from the major.
The gap between the purchase price of the intermediary from the major 
and the sale price to the broadcaster is not representative of the increase 
of cost taken on by the broadcaster, and consequently the burden to resort 
to the intermediary; a more correct estimate could be made comparing 
the price set by the intermediary with the hypothetic target price that the 
major would have applied to the broadcaster through a direct sale.
However, even the comparison between the price applied by the 
intermediary to the broadcaster and that applied by the major through 
direct sale, for how right it is in an optic of accounting methodology of 
pricing, is however impugned by the various negotiating and contractual 
structures and by the different mix of the products sold in the schemes 
of direct sales and in those through intermediaries.
7.5 The financial model inside the film market
It has been clarified that available funding sources to the film industry 
come from soft money and pre-sale of copyrights. With the only excep-
tion of the USA, the access to private funds is residual and represents a 
modest amount of the total budget (Figure 7.4).
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Public funding
Culture is one of the cornerstones of European policies; public aids to 
the audiovisual industry are allowed and designed as part of the internal 
and external policies of the European Union aimed at implementing the 
2005 UNESCO Convention2.
Due to the recognized cultural role of the audiovisual industry, every 
European country has gradually adopted various means of public support. 
In Europe, public aids are historically cinema-oriented; nevertheless, the 
digital revolution fostering the co-existence of traditional linear media 
and new digital and non-linear services has gradually extended the 
sphere of action of public supports to all cultural audiovisual products.
At a European level, the legal framework for public financing is repre-
sented by the Cinema Communication3 and the Creative Europe Programme, 
which provides the “sub-programme MEDIA” dedicated to the audiovisual 
industry4. The rationality behind the financial supports to cultural sectors 
is that the culture is a key tool to promote the European single market and 
to foster social integration through the respect of cultural diversity. The so 
called “cultural exception” allows member States to grant support to the 
industry in accordance with the commitment of not distorting competi-
tion. In this respect, European and national public funds are intended 
primarily for small companies – mainly of the cinema sector – with low 
market share and independent from broadcasters, which are assumed not 
in need of public support and not always oriented at cultural products. 
Besides, aids to the audiovisual industry are allowed in accordance with 
the EU State aid regulation that sets limits to public support calculated in 
percentage of the product total budget: the greater the degree of cultural-
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ity of the product supported, the higher the percentage of the budget that 
can be financed by national public funds.
At a country level, Governmental aids for the audiovisual business 
consist of national and local (regions, counties, councils) support. The 
national support, which involves the all production chains of the audio-
visual industry – development, production, distribution, exhibition – is 
intended for the products, and funds are channelled through grants, soft 
financing or tax incentives, and can be issued automatically or through 
selective screening, based on specific reference systems. Local aids are 
mainly conceived to support producers and exhibitors, principally 
through the refurbishing/conversion of cinemas.
Public funding to the cinema sector has played in the last years a 
role always more marginal in quantitative terms. The percentage quota 
covering the budget by public funds has decreased gradually in time, 
considering the financial crisis and the decreasing public resources allo-
cated to cultural sectors. Only short and documentary films, in relation 
to the degree of culturality and the recognized difficulty in tracing funds 
on the market, are mainly financed by public funds.
In a modern context, however, the importance of public funds in the 
financial cycle of the cinema industry is of a qualitative type. On one 
hand, public involvement has the task of indicating the cultural value 
of the product; on the other hand, it has the unquestionable function of 
being the strength of initiating the process of funding. This is explained 
by the fact that public funds are requested directly by the producer, with-
out resorting to a distribution firm, already in the development phase 
and, therefore, represent, often, the first timely financing.
Pre-sale of copyrights
The movie industry is the most evident example of a financial model 
based on the discounting of future revenues. In quantitative terms, as 
a matter of fact, the financing of a movie product is mainly met by the 
pre-sale of copyrights. From a financial point of view, the movie indus-
try is characterized by a significant mismatching between inflows and 
outflows; the proceeds, as a matter of fact, begin to translate into money 
only some months after the end of the production, with theatrical copy-
rights, while the revenues resulting from the other copyright markets 
can be obtained even after years from the premiere of the product. For 
such reason, the mechanism of pre-sales which allows a partial anticipa-
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tion of the revenues of future copyrights transfer, is fundamental in the 
financial equilibrium of cinema production firms.
The market of television copyrights represents one of the most 
important sources of the financing of cinema products. Until the 70s, 
the greatest source of revenues for the cinema coincided with the box 
office and the producer financed the movie asking for an advance on 
future theatrical proceeds. Afterwards, a decrease in movie-goers and an 
increase in television viewers have made television extremely important, 
both in an economic optic and the financial one.
Either in the case in which the producer makes a co-production with 
the broadcaster or in the case in which he produces autonomously, a 
significant part of financial funds necessary to produce the movie comes 
from the television firm which finances the work by pre-buying televi-
sion copyrights. In such circumstances, the amount deriving from the 
pre-sale of the cable-rights corresponds, for the independent producer, to 
a revenue, and to a financing source.
In Europe, the importance of television broadcasters in the financing 
of the cinema sector is, therefore, stressed also by specific regulation: 
having to consider minimum percentages of programming of national 
and European movies, television broadcasters are indirectly subject to 
an obligation to invest a percentage of their own resources in cinema 
products. Such rules create another connection between the financial 
model of broadcasters and that of movie producers.
Generally, when the broadcaster participates in the project as a 
co-producer, television copyrights are negotiated in the co-production 
agreement directly between the broadcaster and the movie co-producer.
When the film company produces autonomously, the sale of televi-
sion copyrights of the movie are often carried out by a distribution firm 
which takes care of the sale of the movie copyrights on all potential 
markets of exploitation. Even if the producer could negotiate autono-
mously his own copyrights, by praxis he relies on a distribution firm or, 
alternatively, can combine the two options. The distributor, other than 
taking care of the promotion and of the launching of the film, takes 
on, therefore, a decisive role for the economic exploitation of the work 
closing, for the producer, sale deals of copyrights on different channels 
of exploitation, domestic and international. In the cinema market, 
the distributor, generally, assures the producer an advance on future 
 revenues – so called “minimum guarantee” – which he recovers prima-
rily as the proceeds show in money. In such case, the distributor takes on 
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the role of the leading external funder of the movie. Considering such 
service, the distributor asks for a commission and an absolute priority in 
the distribution of revenues up to a concurrence of the applied commis-
sion, of the expenses incurred for the distribution and the launch, of the 
amounts lent under a minimum guarantee title; only after the distributor 
has recovered these amounts, the revenues of the movie could be shared 
between the producer and the distributor himself.
To fully understand the financial model of the cinema industry it is 
necessary, therefore, to understand in detail the types of agreements 
generally used among producers and distributors.
More specifically, film production financial plans normally include 
recoupment agreements between producers and distributors: the so 
called “distribution deal”.
The understanding of the recoupment agreement stated in the distribu-
tion deal is an essential requirement for a first evaluation of the reliability 
of the producer/distributor.
Typologies of distribution deals
There are two standard types of distribution contracts: gross deal and net 
deal.
In the gross deal contract, proceeds originating from the exploitation 
of a film are divided between producer (licensor of the rights) and 
distributor (licensee), according to certain percentages defined in 
the contract. The distribution company, due to the financial support 
provided for production, recovers its expenses according to such 
percentage.
The producer and the distributor will register a profit only in the case 
in which competency revenues, divided according to what stated in the 
distribution contract, will be above the costs incurred.
In the net deal, more commonly used, the revenues are allotted, first of 
all, to cover the anticipated expenses by the distribution (minimum guar-
antee, launch and edition expenses) and, only the remaining amounts are 
divided between producer and distributor according to the percentages 
established. Since the proceeds of the theatrical are not always sufficient 
to cover the expenses anticipated by the distribution, the net deal foresees, 
generally, a clause of cross-collateralization that acknowledges the possi-
bility of using the revenues from the exploitation markets following the 
theatrical to reintegrate the distributor of the incurred costs. Such type of 
agreement states that the incurred expenses by the distribution (minimum 
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guarantee and expenses of launch and edition) could be considered as 
advances granted to the production and, so, represent credits which the 
distribution has towards the producer. Such credits will be consequently 
reimbursed, having priority on revenues generated by the film.
The net deal foresees always the definition of one specific mechanism 
of revenue sharing between the producer and the distributor. Even if by 
praxis each agreement can have different characteristics in relation to 
the specific needs of the parts, and to the peculiar nature of the project, 
it is possible to trace two types of revenue sharing methodologies: lump 
sum (cost off the top) and dynamic (pure net deal).
The costs coverage and the subsequent revenues sharing between 
producer and distributor are carried out differently depending on 
whether the cost off the top method, rather than the pure net deal is used:
the   cost-off the top says that the revenues are destined, primarily, to 
cover distribution expenses and the minimum guarantee; only after 
are the revenues divided between producer and distributor based 
on the percentages established;
the   pure net deal says that the distributor keeps, from the first 
revenues, a distribution fee established by contract; the next 
revenues are destined primarily to cover distribution expenses – 
relying only on the producer quota – and only after are they 
divided between producer and distributor based on the percentages 
set by contract.
An example of net deal agreement
An example of a scheme of net deal helps to understand better the forms 
of revenue sharing between distributor and producer. The following 
example refers to an art house film, with a reduced budget, which has a 
significant box office and that offers the opportunity of exploiting copy-
rights even on markets post-theatrical.
Supposing (Table 7.1), that the movie in question has a production cost 
of €550,000. Supposing, moreover, that in the distribution agreement 
would be established a minimum guarantee, in favour of the producer, 
equivalent to €100,000 and that distribution expenses result equivalent 
to €200,000.
Suppose, then, that following the release, and considering the agree-
ments of pre-sale, the revenues from the various markets are equivalent 
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detracted by exhibitors), €50,000 for Home Video, €100,000 for Pay TV 
and €150,000 for Free TV.
Suppose, lastly, that in the agreement would be established a revenues 
sharing mechanism, imagining that such distribution gives the producer 
70% of revenues resulting from the exploitation of copyrights on vari-
ous markets (theatrical, home video, Pay TV and Free TV), and to the 
distributor the remaining 30%.
In the hypothesis that the distribution contract followed the scheme 
of the cost off the top (Table 7.2), considering the cross-collateralization 
mechanism, the proceeds from box office and of Home Video are entirely 
destined to cover the anticipated expenses by the distribution (distribu-
tion expenses plus minimum guarantee assured to the producer). Only for 
revenues from the sale of copyrights to television follows the distribution 
between producer and distributor, according to the quotas established in 
the distribution agreement.
In the example given, then, the distributor recovers the anticipated 
expenses (€300,000) and obtains a profit equivalent to €75,000, while 
the producer registers a loss equivalent to €275,000, that is the net 
amount between the total production costs (€550,000) and the proceeds 
that, according to the agreements, has been able to use to cover such 
costs (€100,000 from box office and home video, to cover the minimum 
guarantee advanced by the distributor, and €175,000 from television sales 
to cover other production expenses incurred). In such case, the producer 
could reach the covering of expenses, and eventually get a profit, only 
through access to other exploitation markets of copyrights, or through 
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copyrights sales on foreign markets, or still through second sales of 
copyrights on the national market.
Following a dynamic schema, typical of the pure net deal, generally 
used, the revenue sharing is more complex. First of all, as said before, the 
methodology includes always a commission on distribution – calculated 
on theatrical revenues – to cover the quota share of indirect structural 
costs of the distribution firm attributable to the specific project, and not 
included among the costs of edition and launch.
In such a scheme, then, the revenues resulting from the various 
forms of copyrights exploitation are distributed only theoretically 
according to the percent quotas set in the distribution agreement. Such 
distribution does not coincide with the true economic availability of 
the producer and of the distributor of their due sums. As a matter of 
fact, the priority of covering the anticipated expenses by distribution 
(distribution costs plus minimum guarantee) is met, initially, weighing 
on only the quota belonging to the producer. Only in the hypothesis 
when the producer quotas, related to the various exploitation markets, 
and accumulated, are not sufficient to cover the anticipated expenses, 
the coverage would be met also weighing on the quota nominally 
belonging to the distributor.
In the pure net deal, as shown by the example, a quota of the theatri-
cal revenues is destined, first of all, to cover the distribution fee (Table 
7.3). Once the distribution fee is subtracted, the producer quotas 
connected to the box office revenues (net from the distribution fee), to 
copyrights sales of home video, of Pay TV and of Free TV are destined, 
following the agreement and considering the mechanism of cross-
collateralization, to cover the minimum guarantee and the distribution 
expenses. In the example given, from this project the distributor gets 
a net profit of €143,500, while the producer registers a loss equivalent 
to €418,000, that is at the net balance between the total cost of produc-
tion (€550,000) and the revenues that, according to the agreement, 
have been destined to cover production costs (€100,000 to cover the 
minimum guarantee anticipated by the distributor, and €32,000 from 
the transfer of copyrights to Free TV to be used to cover the other 
production costs).
Also in such case, the producer will be able to reach costs coverage, 
and eventually obtain profits, only through access to other markets of 
copyrights exploitation, or through the sale of copyright on foreign 
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the pure net deal method, therefore, the distributor recovers his expenses 
weighing, first of all, on producer quotas: using distributor quotas to 
cover distribution expenses is residual and eventual; in the cost off the top, 
the producer and distributor quotas are added to reach the objective of 
covering costs: the distributor participates with his own quotas to cover 
the expenses incurred.
Whatever might be the performance of the product on various 
markets, in the distributor view the pure net deal is always more conven-
ient; for the producer, on the contrary, the cost off the top represents the 
most advantageous way of distribution of revenues because it allows 
speeding up the recovery of expenses.
In reference to the revenues sharing, it is easy to notice how the 
dynamics of theatrical strongly influence the mechanism: with highly 
successful box office products the producer will regain possession of 
his own quotas of revenues more rapidly, according to the percentages 
established by contract, whether is used the cost off the top or the pure net 
deal.
The example illustrates a case which, in spite of a fair box office success, 
the total accumulated revenues generated by the theatrical and by first 
sales (€550,000) do not cover the total cost of production and distribu-
tion (€750,000) while they cover, nominally, all the costs of production 
(€550,000). It is easy to see, however, how applying the cost off the top and 
the pure net deal, the producer does not recover the expenses incurred. 
The distributor registers, in both cases, a profit, that, therefore, is more 
meaningful in the case of pure net deal.
The recoupment mechanisms included in distribution deals conven-
tionally used determine, therefore, a mechanism of revenues sharing 
which assures a faster reaching of the economic equilibrium by the 
distributor. The producer’s ability to increase profits depends, firstly, 
on the performance generated by the product at the theatrical level 
and is, then, strictly correlated with the artistic strategy adopted. Such 
contractual strength linked to the distributor finds its own ratio in the 
ability of the distributor himself to assure, at the same time, money for 
the production expenses and the closing of the circuit of the copyrights 
exploitation chain, and takes for granted the possibility that the producer 
could exploit the same copyrights on others and on different geographi-
cal markets. The choice between net deal and gross deal, between cost off 
the top and pure net deal, the same as the setting of percentages of the 
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producer and distributor quotas depend, mainly, on the amount of the 
minimum guarantee assured to the producer and on the market power 
which the distributor can claim in assuring a profitable negotiation of 
the copyrights of the work. In synthesis, the distributor, on one hand is 
he who guarantees access to exploitation markets, and on the other hand 
takes on the role of a traditional financier, assuring a minimum guarantee; 
for such reasons, he has priority on waterfalls of revenues of the movie 
which allows him to reach an economic equilibrium more comfortably 
and more rapidly. For the producer, the cost of the distributor involve-
ment is not sustained by an interest payment, as it would happen in case 
of a traditional financing, but in access to revenues conditioned by the 
main fulfilment of the distributor.
The types of agreement among producers and distributors bring out 
clearly how the financial model of the movie industry is strongly based 
on prospective proceeds. The presence of external financing is substan-
tially absent and, in fact, substituted by a particular role taken on by 
distribution firms. Due to the financial crisis, the market is increasingly 
experiencing distribution deals with no minimum guarantee provided by 
distributors. This results in a more convenient revenue sharing mecha-
nism for producers, who in contrast have to face a shortage of internal 
financial resourcers.
7.6  The financial model of the audiovisual web 
market
The economics at the base of the production process of web native 
audiovisual products, strongly conditions also the financial model.
The production dynamic of web products, centred on the self-reference 
of filmmakers, does not generate the urgency to implement sophisticated 
financial models. The costs, generally met by the same filmmakers, are 
designed on real resources of the authors; the amateurish nature of the 
product does not aim at looking for revenue sources on exploitation 
markets. Not foreseeing external financing in the production process, the 
objective to obtain revenues, therefore, is not even important to honour 
eventual debts towards third-party counterparts.
The outlined elements are characteristic of the audiovisual web native 
products promoted by filmmakers and small production companies.
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The need of a more developed financial model, however, could be 
presented for that target of filmmakers who, having gone through 
an amateurish initial phase and gotten to a second step, have the 
need to upgrade the artistic and technical standards of their own 
productions. The legitimate artistic ambitions do not agree with the 
absence of a financial model that, therefore, needs the certainty of 
revenue sources and of a budget proportioned to the real commercial 
potentialities.
For such reasons, it is easy to understand the necessity, also for the web, 
of a well-defined financial model. This, rather than being promoted by 
filmmakers, or by their associations, could find a valuable impulse in the 
SVoD market, where OTT players are active in releasing original and non- 
original contents and Online Video Aggregators (OVA) are emerging. 
OTT and OVA are interested in filling their own platforms of innovative 
content. In such optic, it is possible to imagine that, in the near future, 
there could be new players that would put together on specific platforms 
of web products of audiovisual nature. Such platforms could follow a 
non-profit model or could individualize models of revenue sharing of 
advertising proceeds between the platform that takes care of content, the 
telecom companies and filmmakers. The various mechanisms of sharing 
between advertising agents, telecom and platforms, together with the 
weak attention of filmmakers towards the commercial potentiality of 
their own products and the exploitation of copyrights, do not make it 
easy to implement financial mechanisms that reward the authorial work 
of filmmakers. The entry on the market of players able to package baskets 
of products from different filmmakers would certainly foster the process. 
In the future, it will be necessary to have more transparency on the types 
of agreements which platforms stipulate with advertising agents, and of 
those which the single platforms stipulate with telecom, together with a 
re-visitation of web products copyrights legal framework.
In the financing process of web products, additionally, an important 
role could be played by public resources; public support, in fact, should 
be always more concentrated on cultural and low budget products 
promoted by young authors. The introduction of fiscal incentives specific 
for web native audiovisual products, for example, together with direct 
funds destined to development costs, could represent a valid option 
for a financial model able to support the growth of the web audiovisual 
market and young authors.
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Notes
The overhead costs represent the share of attributable costs to the two movies;  
the unsold risk is estimated equal to the cost of production for the single 
movie ($5).
UNESCO (2005); EC (2012). 
The European Commission has approved a revised version of the Cinema  
Communication: 2013/C 332/01.
Creative Europe is the new EU framework programme for the Cultural and  
Creative sectors (CCS) for the 2014–2020 Multi-Annual Financial Framework 
(MFF). Bringing together the previous Culture, MEDIA and MEDIA Mundus 
programmes under a common framework, it creates a new Guarantee fund to 
improve access to finance (COM/2011/0786).
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